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Partnership by Estoppel
William H. Painter*
Professor Painter considers the concept of partnership by estoppel
in the context of sections 4(2) and 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act
and discusses the analogous liability of the retired partner as set forth
in section 35 of the act. The author concludes that the doctrine of
estoppel in the law of partnership is outdated and suggests that liability
under section 16 as well as section 35 should be based on other grounds.
"Wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of
a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss
must sustain it."' This statement, repeated with tedious frequency
in the cases, is both obvious and misleading in its simplicity, for of
all the maxims of law based on notions of natural justice, this is one
of the most difficult to apply. This discussion will explore it as ap-
plied in the law of partnership, so-called "partnership by estoppel." In
addition, the liability of those who have retired from partnerships will
be considered since, although this is not based on "partnership by
estopper' in the strict sense of the term,2 the problems involved are
analogous.
I. PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL
Section 4(2) of the Uniform Partnership Act, now adopted in 41
states,3 provides that "the law of estoppel shall apply . . . ." The
concept of estoppel in pais, through constant usage, has become a
familiar instrument of torture to first year law students, if not grist for
the mills of faculty and bar examiners. Despite the numerous classifi-
cations of the requisite factors, most of them seem to include at least
the following:
(1) A representation, either by words or conduct,
(2) Made to another, who
(3) Reasonably believing the representation to be true,
(4) Relies upon it, with the result that
(5) He changes his position to his detriment.
*Professor of Law, Villanova University. Member, New York Bar. The author wishes
to express his gratitude to Professors Warren A. Seavey and Brian Hogan, the latter
of Nottingham University, England, for their helpful suggestions during the preparation
of this article. It goes without saying that neither should be estopped from further
criticism, since it is quite clear that they were not "in . . . control of the business."
See UNIFORM Lnmmra PARTNmnSmw ACT § 7.
1. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63, 70, 100 Eng. Rep. 35, 39 (1787).
2. See text discussion following note 59 infra.
3. UNIFORM PATNEnsmp AcT § 4(2).
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Thus in the words of Professor Williston "it is essential that the
party estopped shall have made a representation by words or acts and
that some one shall have acted on the faith of this representation in
such a way that he cannot without damage withdraw from the
transaction."4
Although, as previously indicated, the "law of estoppel" is made ex-
pressly applicable to partnerships by section 4(2) of the Uniform
Partnership Act, section 16 of the act sets forth in more detail the
conditions of liability:
When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents him-
self, or consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in
an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he
is liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made,
who has, on the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or
apparent partnership, and if he has made such representation or consented
to its being made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the
representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person
so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making
the representation or consenting to its being made.
5
It is clear from section 16 that liability by estoppel may result
either from the defendant's representation of himself as a partner, "by
words spoken or written or by conduct" or the defendant's "consent"
to such a representation by another. The first basis of liability presents
relatively little difficulty, being founded on little more than the
principle, well established in the law of contracts, that one should be
held responsible for the apparent or "objective" manifestations of his
intent. If he behaves like a partner, then let him be held liable as a
partner. Hence it is immaterial that the defendant may secretly deny
4. 2 WILSToN, SAL.4s § 312 (rev. ed. 1948). See BESTATEmENT (SEcoND),
AcENcY § 8B (1957). Ewart, in a classic discussion of estoppel, lists no fewer than
eleven elements. EwAIT, AN ExPosrrioN or T E PINCIPLEs or ESTOPPEL BY Mis-
EPRE sENTATION 10 (1900). For an excellent discussion of the origins of the rule in
England (supposedly from Lord Ashhurst's dictum in Lickbarrow v. Mason, supra note
1, or as "one of Lord Mansfield's numerous importations from equity") see Pickering,
Estoppel by Conduct, 55 L.Q. REv. 400, 401 (1939).
5. U~rroiPt PAuNmasmis' ACr § 16(1). This language is obviously derived from
its British counterpart and predecessor, section 14 of the Partnership Act of 1890, 53 &
54 Vict., c. 39, § 14:
"(1) Every one who by words spoken or written or by conduct represents himself,
or who knowingly suffers himself to be represented, as a partner in a particular firm, is
liable as a partner to any one who has on the faith of any such representation given
credit to the firm, whether the representation has or has not been made or communi-
cated to the person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner
making the representation or suffering it to be made."
Like section 4(2) of the Uniform Partnership Act, section 46 of the British statute in
somewhat more general terms makes applicable the "rules of equity and of common
law ... except so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act."
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to himself all connection with the partnership, or even that he is
unaware of the significance of his behavior, if his outward conduct is
such that others believe him to be a partner.6
More difficult, perhaps, is the question of the defendanfs liability
based not on his own acts but on the acts of others, namely the matter
of "consent." Since this may be the most controversial feature of see-
tion 16, it is worthy of more detailed consideration.
A. CONSENT TO "HOLDING OUT"
According to a note by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
section 16 was intended to clarify "several doubts and confusions of
our existing case law... [in that it had been] held that a person is
liable if he has been held out as a partner and knows that he is being
held out, unless he prevents such holding out, even if to do so he has
to take legal action." The cases adopting such a view were, in the
opinion of those who drafted the act, unwise; and it was suggested
that "the weight of authority is to the effect that to be held as a part-
ner he must consent to the holding and that consent is a matter of
fact."7
Among the oldest authorities taking the view that a person, aware
that he is being held out as a partner by others, may be under a duty
to speak out and warn third parties to avoid their being misled is
Fletcher v. Pullen,8 decided in Maryland before adoption of the
Uniform Partnership Act. There, Bramble, a person of dubious finan-
cial standing, represented by means of printed letters, circulars, and
newspaper advertisements that the defendant, Fletcher, was his part-
ner. There was evidence which indicated that Fletcher was aware of
the holding out and that on several occasions he had denied to
others that he was a partner. Yet he took no further steps to inform
the public of the misrepresentation and, in particular, never published
a newspaper notice denying the partnership. The plaintiffs extended
credit to Bramble in reliance on the printed circulars distributed by
him, although they had never seen the newspaper advertisements. In
holding that the question of whether a partnership by estoppel had
been created was one for the jury, the court indicated that, if there
was a holding out of the defendant to the public as a partner "with
his knowledge or assent," this would be sufficient for liability, even
though the plaintiff may not have relied upon the particular form of
6. Fredericktown Milling Co. v. Rider, 179 Ark. 387, 16 S.W.2d 9 (1929); John
Deere Plow Co. v. Klaurens, 153 Kan. 151, 109 P.2d 98 (1941).
7. Commissioners' Note, UN1Omn PA mrNmsm, AcTr § 16 as contained in 7 U.L.A. §
16 (1949).
8. 70 Md. 205, 16 AtI. 887 (1889).
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holding out known to the defendant.9 Hence, assuming that there
is holding out in a sufficiently public manner, the defendant may be
under a duty to do "all that a reasonable and honest man should do,
under similar circumstances, to assert and manifest his refusal, and
thereby prevent innocent parties from being misled."'0 Interestingly
enough, however, the court did not require a printed denial in the
newspaper in order to avoid liability as a matter of law, the question
of the reasonableness of the defendant's efforts to forewarn the
public being one of fact for the jury.
For reasons not immediately apparent, and despite the express
repudiation of the doctrine of Fletcher v. Pullen by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in drafting section 16 of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act," the Maryland courts continue to espouse this view and to
cite Fletcher with either studied indifference to the act or with ap-
parent carelessness.' Although, in jurisdictions which have not
adopted the Uniform Act, the Fletcher doctrine continues to enlist
a respectable following, 13 where the act has been adopted, actual
"consent" rather than mere knowledge or passive acquiescence is
required.14
In the final analysis, as has been pointed out by some who have
attempted to explain or reconcile the Maryland decisions with section
16, it is possible to conceive of situations where "consent" may be
implied from knowledge of the holding out and continued acquies-
9. Id. at 214-15, 16 At. at 888-89. For a discussion of this interesting question
of the relationship between the defendant's awareness or consent to the holding out and
the particular form of the plaintiff's reliance, see text discussion following footnote 35
infra.
10. Id. at 215, 16 Ad. at 889, quoting from P~ARSONS, P ARNERsMP 134 (1867 ed.).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. McBriety v. Phillips, 180 Md. 569, 26 A.2d 400 (1942); see Brocato v. Serio,
173 Md. 374, 196 AtI. 125 (1938).
13. E.g., Martin & Co v. Maggard & Son, 206 Ky. 558, 267 S.W. 1102 (1925); Lutz
v. Miller, 102 W. Va. 23, 135 S.E. 168 (1926); see Kahn Co. v. Bowden & Co., 80
Ark. 23, 96 S.W. 126 (1906); Deputy v. Harris, 15 Del. (1 Marv.) 100, 40 Ad. 714
(Super. Ct. 1893), ret'd on other grounds sub nom. Grier v. Deputy, 15 Del. (1
Mary.) 19, 40 AUt. 716 (1894); Bivins v. Oldham, 224 S.W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920); cf. In re MacDougall, 285 Fed. 445 (S.D. Fla. 1922) (dictum); Tanner &
Delaney Engine Co. v. Hall, 86 Ala. 305, 5 So. 584 (1889) (dictum); Orndorff v.
Cohen, 62 A.2d 794 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948) (dictum); Triangle Mach. Co. v.
Dutton & Adams, 13 La. App. 14, 127 So. 54 (1930).
14. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Henderson, 265 Mass. 322, 163 N.E. 743 (1928);
Munton v. Rutherford, 121 Mich. 418, 80 N.W. 112 (1899) (decided prior to the
passage of the Michigan Act in 1917); cf. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Oles, 152
Misc. 876, 274 N.Y. Supp. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1934). A similar result has been reached in
jurisdictions which have never adopted the act. Anfenson v. Banks, 180 Iowa 1066,
163 N.W. 608 (1917) appears to be the leading case. For other cases and discussion
see 1 RowLYzy, PArTNsmas' 429-31 (2d ed. 1960).
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cence therein over a relatively prolonged period.15 The question of
the existence of "consent" in such a case is still one for the jury but
the scope of section 16 is broadened to include instances where,
although the defendant has done nothing affirmative to manifest "con-
sent," his behavior is inconsistent with the holding out's being with-
out his implied permission. There is considerable merit to this view,
as there is to many a compromise between extreme positions. In ad-
dition, it realistically holds responsible one who passively stands by
and does nothing while others in open and obvious reliance upon his
credit are changing their positions to suffer a detriment. Although it
may be unduly arduous to impose an affirmative duty of notification
co-equal with the extent of holding out, it is not too much to require
a person to behave reasonably under the circumstances, although this
may sometimes entail a duty to take affirmative action to warn others.
If this is all that the Fletcher doctrine means, it is not inconsistent
with the "consent" requirement in section 16, although those who
drafted the act may have thought otherwise. 6 In fact, a respectable
argument may be made that the change introduced into the statute
by the use of the word "consents" as opposed to its English statutory
analogy "knowingly suffers," was unwise. If one knows of his being
held out and that others may be hurt as a result of a misunderstand-
ing, is it not his social responsibility to avert the harm, if he can do so
without undue effort? Although it may be true that, in some areas
of the law of torts, I am not my brother's keeper and have no legal
duty to act to prevent others from being hurt, should the same result
be reached in the law of partnership where others are hurt by relying
on my good name? Perhaps the doctrine of non-liability for "passive
acquiescence" is more consistent with a philosophy of indifference to
the welfare of others than it is with a supposed policy of protecting
the interests of individuals from the frequently minimal inconvenience
of a public denial of what is being said about them. Moreover, it
seems consistent with the underlying theory of estoppel that, where
one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, the
loss should fall upon the individual who, with the least effort, could
have averted the harm. Unless the circumstances are such as to put
the plaintiff on notice of the defendant's being misrepresented as a
15. 6 MD. L. REv. 337 (1942); 3 MD. L. ftv. 189 (1939). It goes without saying
that silence in a face-to-face introduction to the plaintiff of the defendant as a partner
may impose an immediate duty to correct any erroneous impression of apparent partner-
ship (i.e., where X is introduced by Y to Z as a partner). E.g., Clarke v. Woodward,
76 Ga. App. 181, 45 S.E.2d 473 (1947).
16. This of course entails the supposition that the act should not be construed in the
manner suggested by the draftsmen; and yet, words having, since the time of Holmes,
retained their flexibility, there is no necessity that the word "consent" should have
an epidermis so rigid as to preclude liability based on passive acquiescence alone.
1963]
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partner, the latter is generally in a better position to act affirmatively
to avoid injury to others. Why, then, should he not be legally re-
quired to do so?
B. RELiAN E
Of equal importance with the requirement of consent is that of
reliance by the third party upon the representation. This is made
explicit in section 16 of the act in that the plaintiff must have "on
the faith of . . . [the] representation, given credit to the actual or
apparent partnership.""'
The reliance requirement is but an application of the traditional
rules of estoppel in pais to the law of partnership. This became evi-
dent in an early holding by the United States Supreme Court in-
volving the liability of an alleged partner of a bank upon a draft
accepted by the partnership.'8 The court held that, in the absence of
a partnership in fact, liability can be based only on the plaintiff's
having extended credit to the partnership in reliance upon the de-
fendant's connection with it, and hence, where the plaintiff is not
aware of the holding out, there can be no recovery. Moreover, it was
suggested that "There may be cases in which the holding out has been
so public and so long continued that the jury may infer that one
dealing with the partnership knew it and relied upon it, without direct
testimony to that effect. But the question.., is, as in other cases of
estoppel in pais, a question of fact for the jury, and not of law for the
court."19
Reliance, then, is essential, but what sort of reliance and upon what?
The act requires that the plaintiff, "on the faith of ... [the] represen-
17. See text discussion prior to note 5 supra.
18. Thompson v. First Natl Bank, 111 U.S. 529 (1884).
19. Id. at 537. Note the similarity of the suggestion raised by the court's dictum
to the problem of the "consent" requisite to establish holding out, discussed in text
prior to note 16 supra. With regard to the latter, the significance of public reputation
is less in that not only must it be shown that there has been a sufficiently notorious
holding out to the public, but also that the defendant knew of the holding out and
that, in view of such knowledge, there was a correlative duty to warn others. See, e.g.,
the observation of the court in Anfenson v. Banks, supra note 14, to the effect that,
where the defendant has no actual knowledge of a report or reputation in the com-
munity that he is a partner, "he is under no duty to inquire or investigate whether
anything of that kind is afloat in the community, and, if in fact ignorant thereof, he
cannot be held to liability as for the truth of the report on the theory that he ought
to have known it." 163 N.W. at 618-19. This is of course different from saying that the
jury may still consider the extent of public knowledge of the holding out on the question
of whether the defendant in fact knew of it. Even if such knowledge were found, how-
ever, it is further necessary, as pointed out above, that there be a duty to act affirna-
tively to warn others and, as indicated by the holdings referred to in note 14 supra,
many courts have been reluctant to go this far. Hence it seems safe to say that, if
public reputation is at all relevant to the merits of the controversy, as bearing upon
the state of mind of the plaintiff or defendant, evidence in this area should be more
readily admissible as affecting reliance by the plaintiff than consent by the defendant.
[VOL.. 16
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tation [must have] given credit to the actual or apparent partner-
ship."20 Must the plaintiff's reliance be reasonable under the
circumstances? Is it necessary to show that, but for the holding out
of the defendant, the plaintiff would not have advanced credit to the
supposed partnership? Must there be specific reliance upon the
defendant's financial standing?
First, as to the question of reasonableness, although the act makes
no mention of this, it has traditionally been a part of the law of
estoppel, and hence it is not surprising, in view of section 4(2) of
the act,21 that reasonable reliance has been required in cases based
upon the statute or otherwise. This implies that occasionally the
plaintiff may have a duty to investigate. Thus, in Weil Brothers v.
Hanks,2 one Coughlin was doing business as a cotton merchant and
was permitted by the defendant to use his store as his center of
operations. The defendant acted also as Coughlins agent in the
purchase and sale of cotton, receiving and making payments on
Coughlin's behalf, retaining a commission of twenty-five cents per
bale for himself. In such a situation it was held that, the circumstances
being ambiguous, it was the plaintiff's duty to investigate further into
the relationship between Coughlin and the defendant and that, with-
out such further inquiry, the plaintiff would not have been justified
in assuming the existence of a partnership. "As a matter of law," the
court said, "we think his failure to [make inquiry] ... must be re-
garded as negligence . .. even conceding that [the defendant's] ...
conduct was equivocal and possibly misleading."'  In contrast, where
the representations of partnership have been made directly to the
plaintiff and little is left for him to surmise, he may have no obligation
to inquire further.25 Between these two extremes, the question of
reasonableness is one for the jury, unless, of course, there is no
evidence of reliance itself, in which case the question of reasonable-
ness cannot arise.
A more difficult problem is presented by whether there must be
specific reliance upon the defendant's financial standing in order to
impose liability upon him. Essentially this involves the causal re-
20. See text discussion prior to note 5 supra.
21. See text discussion prior to note 4 supra.
22. E.g., Weil Bros v. Hanks, 201 Ala. 39, 77 So. 333 (1917); West Side Trust Co.
v. Gascoigne, 39 N.J. Super. 467, 121 A.2d 441 (Super. Ct. 1956).
23. 201 Ala. 39, 77 So. 333 (1917).
24. Id. at 40, 77 So. at 334.
25. Gershner v. Scott-Mayer Comm'n Co., 93 Ark. 301, 124 S.W. 772 (1910).
26. Threads, Inc. v. Williams, 84 Ga. App. 804, 67 S.E.2d 591 (1951) (no reliance
due to plaintiff's assumption that he was dealing with a corporation); West Side Trust
Co. v. Gascoigne, supra note 22 (jury question); Goodwin v. Winston, 241 Mo. App. 357,




lationship between the holding out of the defendant as a partner and
the plaintiffs extension of credit. Here section 16 of the act, in pro-
viding merely that the plaintiff be one "who has, on the faith of such
representation, given credit," is of little assistance. Need it be shown
that, but for the holding out of the defendant as a partner, the credit
would not have been given (a showing that involves all the difficulties
of proof entailed in what logicians term a "contrary-to-fact assump-
tion")? Or is it sufficient to show merely that (1) the defendant was
held out to the plaintiff as a partner, and (2) the plaintiff, with
knowledge of the holding out, extended credit to the partnership?
If the latter be true, it is of course irrelevant that the plaintiff would
have extended credit in any case, even if he were unaware of the
holding out. The determining factors would be that he was aware
and did extend credit.
At first glance the language of the act might incline one to believe
that, since the credit must be given "on the faith of such representa-
tion," a specific "but-for" causal relationship is necessary. judicial
discussion of the problem has been unsatisfactory and infrequent.
Little significance has been given to the language of section 16 and
varying results have been achieved whether or not the statute hap-
pened to govern. Thus a recent California decision, Hunter v. Croys-
dill,27 albeit perhaps by dictum, is quite emphatic in expressing the
view that the plaintiff's reliance need be only upon the existence of
the partnership and the defendant's membership in it, and not on
defendant's financial standing. Similarly, in Indiana, before adoption
of the statute, it was held erroneous to have instructed the jury that
in order to find for the plaintiff it would be necessary to demonstrate
that, by reason of his having associated the defendant with the firm,
the plaintiff "has sustained some financial loss, or stands to sustain a
financial loss."2 In contrast, in Wisconsin, a statutory state, the
supreme court, on a somewhat specialized set of facts, has held the
standard of reliance to be so strict that the plaintiff must show that,
but for the holding out, he would not have given credit to the firm.29
27. 169 Cal. App. 2d 307, 337 P.2d 174 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Here there was some
evidence to the effect that the plaintiff had relied on the defendant's financial standing
in extending credit, but the court considered this to be irrelevant.
28. Irvine v. Baxter Stove Co., 70 Ind. App. 105, 123 N.E. 185 (1919). The instruction
was held to have been harmless error, however, since, the judgment having been for
the plaintiff, it was obviously more favorable to the defendant than necessary and
hence could form no basis for a reversal.
29. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Lehmann, 274 Wis. 331, 80 N.W.2d 267 (1957). The case
involved the rights of a telephone company where a telephone number listing was
changed from the name of Wayne R. Lehmann to that of W. R. Lehmann & Son
(allegedly implying an association between Wayne, the son, and his father, W. R.
Lehmann, on.whose farm the son had been permitted to set up a business). The likeli-
hood of confusion was made even greater by the fact that the son and father had
formerly been in business together, but the father had discontinued the relationship.
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It has been suggested that this extreme view should be applied only
where there have been prior dealings between the plaintiff and the
supposed partner of the defendant, i.e., prior extension of credit. In
such a case, the plaintiff could recover only if it were shown that he
had become dissatisfied with the credit rating of the defendant's
supposed partner and continued to extend credit in reliance on the
defendant's financial standing. Under other circumstances, however,
where the plaintiff has not previously dealt with the firm, it seems
unduly burdensome to impose upon him the rigors of a "but-for"
test, since this complicates the problems of proof to the point that
recovery is unusually difficult.30 This seems to be a reasonable view;
in most instances where the plaintiff is aware of the holding out and,
being so aware, extends credit to what he supposes is a partner-
ship, he will be motivated at least in part by an assumption, albeit a
vague one, that the defendant is financially responsible and that his
credit stands back of that of the firm. Hence there should be at least
a presumption of reliance on the defendant's financial responsibility,
subject to possible rebuttal by a showing of complete indifference on
the part of the plaintiff to the representation.
31
C. RELIANCE IN TORT RECOVERY
The most formidable obstacle to recovery in tort based on partner-
ship by estoppel is the reliance requirement. It is only in a rather
unusual situation that the plaintiff will have relied on the holding out
of the defendant as a partner in the enterprise. More often than not,
although the cause of action is characterized as one in tort, it partakes
of contractual aspects. Fraud or deceit in connection with the sale of
Hence it was not surprising that the plaintiff's employees may have assumed that the
business association was continuing. This, however, was held to be irrelevant in the
absence of a showing that the plaintiff would not have continued a telephone listing
had it known the true facts. Under the circumstances, since the son had had a prior
listing under his own name and the telephone company had not been dissatisfied with
this arrangement, the holding seems reasonable and thus may not stand for the
broader view that, under other conditions, a "but-for" relationship must be shown.
30. 56 MicH. L. REv. 139 (1957). But see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Barger, 108
Ohio App. 67, 160 N.E.2d 554 (1958), where, despite the lack of previous dealings
between plaintiff and defendant's supposed partner, the court emphasized the fact that
the plaintiff apparently paid little attention to the identity of the persons with whom
he was dealing and their business relationship, being interested only in obtaining the
services of persons who could do a job (installing a heating system) at the lowest bid.
Perhaps the holding is based less on a "strict" view of reliance than it is on the
possibility that there may have been a complete absence of reliance, such as was the
case in Threads, Inc. v. Williams, 84 Ga. App. 804, 67 S.E.2d 591 (1951), where
the plaintiff mistakenly thought he was dealing with a corporation instead of a partner-
ship. See note 26 supra.
31. Indifference such as that displayed in Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Lehmann, supra
note 29, or amounting to complete absence of reliance, as was present in Threads v.
Williams, supra note 30.
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goods is an obvious example. Here, although there may be liability in
contract as well, the underlying considerations are the same with
regard to reliance and hence it is not surprising that tort recovery has
been allowed on the ground of estoppel.32 More difficult are cases
involving the performance of services, but even here, if there is an
implied undertaking to use reasonable care, there may be recovery.
Thus in a malpractice action against purported physician-partners who
owned a hospital, the plaintiff, in submitting to treatment, presumably
relied on the skill and financial responsibility of those who appeared
to be in charge 33 Analogous, but perhaps less convincing, is a case
which allowed recovery by a business invitee for injuries sustained
on premises apparently under the control of a father, who had retired
to leave his son in sole charge of the business.3 And passengers in
taxicabs have been held to rely on the apparent ownership of the
taxi, on which they presumably would not have embarked if it were
not for the name of the defendant prominently displayed on the
vehicle. Pedestrians in the street are of course not entitled to the
comparative luxury of choosing the vehicle which inflicts their in-
juries and hence estoppel is of no avail.3
Arguably, even though there may be some form of reliance in spe-
cialized tort situations, recovery should not be available under section
16, since the latter requires that "credit" be given in reliance upon
the representation. Except, perhaps, for fraud or deceit in sale of
goods or other contract cases, it is doubtful, to put it mildly, that the
injured party has "given credif' in reliance upon anything. At most he
may have relied upon the defendant's financial responsibility and his
control of the premises whereon he is hurt, or the instrumentality
which inflicts the harm, but it would be incongruous to characterize
him as thereby "giving credif' to anyone. Possibly liability may be
available under section 4(2) of the statute, making applicable the
general "law of estoppel." Here again, however, problems arise with
regard to the reliance requirement and the causal relation between
reliance and the harm. Is it realistic to suppose that, when entering
a building, embarking in a taxicab, or entrusting myself to the
care of a physician, I am warmed with an inner reassurance that,
in case of a fall down an elevator shaft, a collision, or a slip of the
knife, the apparent partner, as well as the actual partner, will be
responsible in damages? If asked concerning this the average person
would be inclined to think more in terms of the availability of insur-
32. Cases collected in 55 MIcH. L. REV. 1190 (1957).
33. Cook v. Coleman, 90 W. Va. 748, 111 S.E. 750 (1922).
34. Jewison v. Dieudonne, 127 Minn. 163, 149 N.W. 20 (1914).
35. 55 Micr. L. REv. 1190 n.9 (1957) (citing cases). Of course, even in the case
of passengers, reliance may be difficult to show. See, e.g., Middleton v. Frances, 257
Ky. 42,77 S.W.2d 425 (1934).
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ance than the possibility of his being able to add more parties as
defendants. Unlike the contract situation, where "credit" is given,
reliance by the plaintiff is likely to be totally absent or, even assuming
a vague assumption of the defendant's responsibility for what may
happen, there is little if any motivation or causal relation between the
apparent partnership and the defendants conduct. Hence it could
hardly be said that the plaintiff has, in the words of section 16, done
anything "on the faith of [the] ... representation."
D. DEFEDAmNr's KNOWLEDGE OF PLADr IF' s RELIANCE
Suppose that the defendant is aware that he is being held out as a
partner through advertisements in a local newspaper, but he is not
aware of his also being held out as a partner by other means, such
as printed circulars and word of mouth. The plaintiff, unaware of the
newspaper advertisements, relies on the printed circulars. Can there
be recovery? To put the question in terms of section 16 of the
Uniform Partnership Act, need the representation upon which the
plaintiff has relied be one to which the defendant has consented? The
few authorities on this rather abstruse point, including the statute,
indicate an answer in the negative, provided that the defendant has
consented to some form of holding out in a public manner (e.g., a
newspaper). Perhaps the earliest case to raise this question was
Edmundson v. Thompson & Blakey,6 where two persons, Thompson
and Blakey, agreed to form a partnership at some time in the future
(the agreement having later been abandoned). Before formation of
the partnership, Thompson had introduced Blakey to several persons
as his partner. But Blakey was never so introduced to the plaintiff,
who had heard of his connection with the supposed partnership
through others. The court concluded that, since Blakey had not held
himself out as partner nor had he authorized Thompson to do so,
no recovery could be had on a theory of estoppel. Significantly, the
decision was prior to the enactment in England of the Partnership
Act of 1890, which, in section 14, may have repudiated the holding.37
At approximately the same time, Fletcher v. Pullen,8 which became
a leading American case in the field, was decided on facts similar
to the hypothetical suggested above. That the plaintiff had never
seen the newspaper advertisements which held Fletcher out as a
36. 2 F. & F. 564, 175 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1861).
37. See note 5 supra. The language of the latter part of the British statute is sub-
stantially identical with that in section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act, except for
the addition, in the latter, of the requirement that the representation be made "in a
public manner" and the use of the word "consents" in the Uniform Act instead of the
English word "suffers." For this interesting suggestion as to the possible origins of the
statutory language in the Partnership Act of 1890 I am indebted to Mr. Brian Hogan,
Lecturer in Law, Nottingham University, England.
38. 70 Md. 205, 16 Atl. 887 (1889).
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partner, relying on printed circulars instead, was said to have made-
no difference, if there was a holding out in a public manner. Despite
the rejection by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the
main part of the Fletcher case, namely the basing of liability upon
mere knowledge and passive acquiescence, 39 this subsidiary aspect of
the holding appears to have been left undisturbed by the importation
into the statute, apparently from section 14 of its English counterpart,
of the following rather mysterious language:
[Alnd if... [the defendant] has made such representation or consented to
its being made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the
representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person
so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making
the representation or consenting to its being made.
40
This awkward clause is apparently little more than an attempt ta
codify what may have been the law in America and what in England
was the law by statute; namely that, if there is a holding out "in a
public manner" either by the defendant or by another with the de-
fendant's consent, then the defendant need not consent specifically t&
the particular form of holding out upon which the plaintiff has re-
lied. Why this relatively simple concept required such complex
terminology is an enigma. For example, the same effect could be
achieved by the following:
and if such representation has, either by the apparent partner or with his
consent, been made in a public manner, he may be held liable to one who
relies upon the apparent partnership even though he is not aware of being
held out as a partner to the individual seeking recovery.
Aside from these niceties of draftsmanship, however, the result
achieved seems correct for, ff the defendant has consented to a public
holding out, why should he complain ff he is unaware of the manner
in which the plaintiff acquired his knowledge of the apparent partner-
ship? This of course assumes that there is some form of reliance by
the plaintiff, i.e., that, even though he may not have read the news-
paper, he still believes the defendant to be connected with the firm.
39. See note 7 supra.
40. UNwIFonm PARm~TNmsms ACT § 16. See note 37 supra. Although no authorities
have been found construing the statutory language, several common law holdings, in
addition to Fletcher v. Pullen, supra note 38, are available: Fredericktown Milling Co.
v. Rider, 179 Ark. 387, 16 S.W.2d 9 (1929); see Kahn Co. v. Bowden & Co., 80 Ark.
23, 96 S.W. 126 (1906); Folks v. Burletson, 177 Mich. 6, 142 N.W. 1120 (1913)
(alternative holding). Significantly, the court in the Folks case suggests that liability
based on "holding out to the public" differs from that based upon estoppel, which,
requires a representation directly to the plaintiff. In this respect, section 16 may
provide for a form of liability broader than the traditional concept of estoppel. See-
text discussion following note 71 infra.
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If, because of the newspaper, to which the defendant has consented,
the rumor of his purported connection with the partnership is abroad in
-the community, why should recovery be limited to newspaper readers?
II. LL&Bnxry ArTRa RETREMENT
One of the most frequently encountered problems in this area is the
liability of a former partner after his retirement. Prior to dissolution,
unless the partner is "dormant,"41 there is a holding out of him to the
public which, since it is consented to, would make him liable under
section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act. But he is liable for part-
nership obligations not under section 16 but, rather, on the general
_principle that all persons who are partners in fact, whether they be
"dormant" or known to the public, whether there be reliance by others
or not, are liable for all partnership obligations. 42 However, retirement
of a partner ordinarily results in dissolution of the partnership,43 and
-hence liability based on partnership "in fact" disappears. If there is
a continued holding out of the retired person as an existing partner, it
is obvious that liability based on estoppel may result. But there is an
important difference between this situation and that where no partner-
ship "in fact" was ever brought into existence. Due to the previous
association of the retired person with the firm, liability need not be
based upon his consent to a holding out. Rather, he continues liable
as a partner for obligations entered into subsequent to his retirement
unless a rather specialized form of notice is given to those who deal
with the firm. Thus section 35 of the act provides, in part:
(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership except as provided
in Paragraph (3)
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or
completing transactions unfinished at dissolution;
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership if dissolution
had not taken place, provided the other party to the transaction
(I) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and had
no knowledge or notice of the dissolution; or
(II) Though he had not so extended credit, had nevertheless known
of the partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or
notice of dissolution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in
a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or in each place if
more than one) at which the partnership business was regularly carried
on.
(2) The liability of a partner under paragraph (1b) shall be satisfied out of
partnership assets alone when such partner had been prior to dissolution
(a) Unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract is
made; and
41. See discussion in text following note 63 infra.
42. See UNIFORM PARTNERsmp AcT § 15.
43. Id. § 31.
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(b) So far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs that the business
reputation of the partnership could not be said to have been in any
degree due to his connection with it.
Ignoring for the moment paragraph (2) relating to the so-called
"dormant" partner, it is clear that section 35 provides for liability
based not on holding out, but rather on failure to give certain kinds of
notice. Thus subparagraph (1) (b) (I) provides that those who had
extended credit prior to dissolution, in the absence of their knowledge
of dissolution, are entitled to actual notice." For all others, including
those who may have dealt previously with the partnership on other
than a credit basis,45 a form of constructive notice by newspaper pub-
lication is sufficient.
The liability of a retired partner to those who have extended credit
prior to dissolution and continue to do so in the absence of knowledge
or notice is comparatively strict. The burden is on the defendant to
show notice, rather than on the plaintiff to show lack of notice.46 And,
unlike liability based on estoppel, unless the partner is "dormant,"41
the "prior dealer" may recover even though he may not have known
of the defendant or his connection with the partnership, and a fortiori
it need not be shown that the credit was subsequently extended on
the faith of the retired partner's continued membership. 48
44. E.g., Credit Bureaus v. Shipman, 167 Cal. App. 2d 673, 334 P.2d 1036 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Security State Bank v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 332, 214 N.W. 51 (1927);
Schwartz Bros. & Co. v. Beacham, 157 Miss. 93, 127 So. 689 (1930); Johnson Tire
Co. v. Maddux, 188 Tenn. 626, 221 S.W.2d 948 (1949). Note that a distinction is
drawn between "knowledge" and "notice" of dissolution. Section 3 of the act provides
that a person has "knowledge" of a fact "not only when he has actual knowledge
thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such other facts as in the circumstances
shows bad faith." "Notice," on the other hand, depends not upon the state of mind of
the plaintiff, but on certain actions taken by the defendant or by another on his
behalf. Thus a person is held to have "notice" of a fact, "when the person who claims
the benefit of the notice: (a) States the fact to such person, or (b) Delivers through
the mail, or by other means of communication, a written statement of the fact to such
person or to a proper person at his place of business or residence." Under section 35
of the act, either "knowledge" or "notice" of dissolution is sufficient with regard to
those who prior to dissolution have extended credit. A fortiori a subsequent creditor
with knowledge of dissolution is bound. E.g., Carvalho v. McCoy, 128 Cal. App. 2d
702, 276 P.2d 21 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
45. E.g., Askew v. Silman, 95 Ga. 678, 22 S.E. 573 (1895).
46. E.g., Torvend v. Patterson, 136 Cal. App. 120, 28 P.2d 413 (1933). Thus,
although the mailing of a written notice may raise a presumption of delivery, in the
absence of testimony to the effect that the notice was properly stamped and addressed
the presumption vanishes on testimony as to non-receipt and the burden of proof thus
remains with the defendant. Meyer v. Krohn, 114 Il1. 574, 2 N.E. 495 (1885); Poage
Milling Co. v. Howard & Co., 227 Ky. 353, 13 S.W.2d 266 (1929); Reid-Murdock &
Co., v. Model Meat & Grocery Co., 204 Ky. 795, 265 S.W. 322 (1924); Austin v.
Holland, 69 N.Y. 571 (1877).
47. See discussion in text following note 63 infra.
48. Leib & Son v. Craddock, 87 Ky. 525, 9 S.W. 838 (1888); Elkinton v. Booth,
143 Mass. 479, 10 N.E. 460 (1887); Elmira Iron & Steel Rolling Mill Co. v. Harris,
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It is perhaps obvious that the requisite notice ma, be given to a
plaintiff through an agent who was authorized, either actually or ap-
parently, to receive notice on his behalf, or perhaps through one who,
although without actual or apparent authority, had a "power" to bind
his principal. 4 9 More specifically, section 35 speaks in terms of the
creditor's "knowledge or notice" of dissolution, and it is clear from
section 3 that the two terms are not necessarily synonymous. Thus a
person is held to have "knowledge" of something either when he in
fact knows of it or when he has knowledge of "such other facts as in
the circumstances shows bad faith." "Notice," on the other hand,
depends on whether the person who seeks to benefit by the giving
of notice has performed certain acts: either orally informing another
of the firm's dissolution or delivering a written statement to that
effect to the person or his agent at his place of business or residence. 5i
Thus, in the words of Professor Seavey,
[Notice] exists where one performs an act, specified by legal rules, by which
he acquires certain rights against others, who, for the purposes for which
the act was done are treated, in general, as having knowledge. [With re-
gard to knowledge] . . . the only important fact to be determined . . . is
whether or not action has been taken with knowledge of certain facts. In the
first type we look at the act of the one claiming rights under the notice;
in the second, at the knowledge of the one whose responsibility is increased
because of it.51
The distinction seems clear enough in theory, unless, that is, one
should be foolish enough to read the decisions, which often fail to
appreciate it.52 But what is its utility? Despite the confusion in the
124 N.Y. 280, 26 N.E. 541 (1891); see Rowland v. Estes, 190 Pa. 111, 42 Ad. 528
(1899). According to the court in the Elmira case, the rule is founded upon "the
methods largely adopted in business circles for the purpose of ascertaining whether
credit shall be given. The competition in business and rapidity with which orders must
be filled make it necessary for business houses to promptly ascertain . . . the financial
condition of . . . firms and individuals engaged in business. The inquiry addressed
naturally is, what is the financial condition of Jones & Co.? For, having no acquaintance
with the individuals comprising the firm, information as to membership does not aid
the inquirer." Elmira Iron & Steel Rolling Mill Co. v. Harris, supra at 292-93, 26
N.E. at 545.
49. E.g., Hunt & Co. v. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 1 Colo. App. 120, 27 Pac.
873 (1891); Ach & Co. v. Barnes & Co., 107 Ky. 219, 53 S.W. 293 (1899); Westing-
house Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hubert, 175 Mich. 568, 141 N.W. 600 (1913); Robertson
Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 96 Minn. 527, 105 N.W. 972 (1905); Jenkins Bros. Shoe Co.
v. Renfrow & Co., 151 N.C. 323, 66 S.E. 212 (1909); Hurst Boillin Co. v. Jones, 152
Tenn. 535, 279 S.W. 392 (1926).
50. UNwoni Pni ~raiHsn ACT § 3. See note 44 supra.
51. Seavey, Notice Through an Agent, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1916). The distinc-
tion and terminology have been adopted by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
AGENCY § 9 (1957).
52. E.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Dean, 154 App. Div. 869, 139 N.Y. Supp. 835 (1913).
This is apparently a case of knowledge since no notice bad been given by the defend-
ant. Since there was evidence that the cashier and at least one director of the plaintiff
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cases, liability based on notice may be broader than that based on
knowledge. Thus a notice given to one who is apparently authorized
to act on another's behalf, or even in the absence of apparent authori-
ty, notice to one who has a so-called "power" to bind another, may
be effective under circumstances where knowledge would not ordi-
narily be imputed. Similarly, liability based on notice encounters
none of the obstacles of "imputed" knowledge, such as the perplexing
"adverse interest" rule, preventing the imputation of the agent's
knowledge to his principal where he is acting adversely to him.53 On
the other hand, where the defendant has not given "notice" to the
other party or to his agent, he may yet be relieved from liability on
the somewhat less effective ground of imputed knowledge, provided
that the agent, in acquiring the knowledge, was acting within the
scope of his authority.
In some situations the knowledge of the agent, even though ac-
quired in connection with a previous employment, may be imputed
to the principal. Thus in Haines v. Starkey,4 the plaintiffs, having
had no previous dealings with the defendants, made sales to them
subsequent to dissolution of the partnership, through Berkemeyer,
who acted for the plaintiffs as agent for undisclosed principals. Berke-
meyer had previously represented others who, prior to the partner-
ship's dissolution had sold on credit (thus being prior dealers). Al-
though the plaintiffs extended credit subsequent to the dissolution on
the assumption, based on a statement made to them by Berkemeyer,
that the partnership was still in existence, normally they would not
have been entitled to actual notice of the dissolution, since they were
not prior dealers. It was held, however, that the defendants would be
liable as partners unless actual notice of dissolution were given the
plaintiffs through their agent, Berkemeyer, since the latter's knowledge
of the finn acquired in connection with his prior transactions on behalf
of those who were prior dealers, would be imputed to his present
principals. The latter then, by virtue of the wondrous doctrine of
imputed knowledge, for all practical purposes were promoted to the
perhaps undeserved status of prior dealers as regards the defendants.5
bank knew of the dissolution, the jury was justified in finding for the defendant, the
court observing that "If the jury found that sufficient notice of a dissolution came to
the knowledge of the officers and directors of the bank . . . that would constitute
notice to the bank." Union Nat'l Bank v. Dean, supra at 874, 139 N.Y. Supp. at
839-40. (Emphasis added.) Conversely, in Straus, Gunst & Co. v. Sparrow & Co.,
148 N.C. 309, 62 S.E. 308 (1908), the plaintiff, a prior dealer, was given notice both by
mail and by oral notification to his agent within the scope of the latter's authority, and
yet the court speaks in terms of "imputed knowledge."
53. See RFsTATMENT (SEcoND), AGENcY §§ 271, 282 (1957); SEAVEY, REUSCHLEIN
& HALL, CAsEs ON AGENCY A PARTaNRsm 289-90 (1962 ed.); Seavey, supra note
51.
54. 82 Minn. 230, 84 N.W. 910 (1901).
55. Here obviously the principal, by imputed knowledge, acquired additional rights.
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Since the case was decided prior to the adoption in Minnesota of the
Uniform Partnership Act, it is interesting to speculate whether it
would have come out the same way under section 35, which provides
for actual notice in the case of prior dealers and for constructive
notice by publication with regard to all others who have "known
of the partnership prior to dissolution." Clearly it is only by virtue
of the imputed knowledge doctrine that the plaintiff could qualify
for even the second of these two categories. To give him the status
of a prior creditor as well, and require actual, rather than constructive,
notice, may be to extend the fiction of imputed knowledge to produce
an incongruous result. Yet, in view of the agent's having previously
acted on behalf of other undisclosed principals who were prior dealers
and thus, as far as the defendants were concerned, the agent was ap-
parently acting on his own and was a prior dealer, it seems reason-
able to require that they give actual notice of the firm's dissolution
to the agent, as they normally would to any person who previously
had extended credit. Moreover, since as agent for an undisclosed
principal, the agent could have sued on the contract, why should not
his principal have rights of equal dignity and hence be able to recover
in the absence of actual notice?
56
As already indicated, those who have not extended credit to the
partnership prior to dissolution are entitled to a form of constructive
notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation,57 but
subject to an important condition, namely that they must have "known
of the partnership prior to dissolution."5 8 This is apparently little more
It goes without saying that he may similarly acquire additional liabilities, as where the
agent, in a previous employment, acquired knowledge of the dissolution of the partner-
ship and such knowledge is now imputed to the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 276 (1957).
56. Haines v. Starkey, 82 Minn. 230, 233, 84 N.W. 910, 911 (1910).
57. The statutory method of notice by publication appears to be exclusive. Thus no
other method of constructive notice is adequate, although other methods of publication
may serve as evidence of "knowledge" of the plaintiff as distinct from "notice." See
note 44 supra and text discussion prior to note 51 supra. Cf. Credit Bureaus v. Ship-
man, 167 Cal. App. 2d 673, 334 P.2d 1036 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (by implication).
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act, there were numerous cases
involving the question of adequacy of certain types of notice by publication. E.g.,
Lovejoy v. Spafford, 93 U.S. 430 (1876); Ellison v. Sexton, 105 N.C. 356, 11 S.E.
180 (1890) (publication once in a local newspaper insufficient); Citizens' Nat'l Bank
v. Weston, 162 N.Y. 113, 56 N.E. 494 (1900) (publication in Dun & Bradstreet's
insufficient); Bank of Monongahela Valley v. Weston, 159 N.Y. 201, 54 N.E. 40 (1899)
(same).
58. UNoRm PARTNERsHm ACT § 35 (1) (b) (II). See discussion in text prior to,
note 44 supra; see, e.g., Vogler v. Ingrao, 123 Cal. App. 2d 341, 266 P.2d 826 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1954), holding that, although the burden may be on the defendant to show
that notice, where required, has been given, it is part of the plaintiff's case to show
that he had known of the partnership prior to dissolution. Hence the plaintiff's failure




than a codification of the common law, since the same result has
been reached in jurisdictions in the absence of statute.59 Non-prior
dealers who, as of the time of dissolution of the partnership, have
no knowledge of its existence, should not be entitled to maintain
thereafter that they advanced credit in reliance upon it, except in
situations where liability is based on estoppel. Liability of the latter
type is, of course, based on the "holding out" theory of section 16,
discussed above and not on section 35. Section 16 liability depends not
upon the absence of knowledge or notice but on the defendant's "con-
sent" to others continuing to hold him out as a partner, and the plain-
tiff's reliance thereon. Thus in many situations two types of liability are
present, one based on section 35, requiring merely that the plaintiff
have "known of the partnership prior to dissolution" and not have
been given the requisite form of notice, and the other based on the
more burdensome requirements of section 16. The two are quite
different. Thus it does not follow that because a former partner
has not given the notice requisite to relieve himself from liability
under section 35, he thereby "consents" to a continued holding out by
others of himself as a partner. Conversely, if a partner retires without
giving notice, prior dealers and those who knew of the partnership
prior to dissolution may recover, despite the fact that the defendant
may have done nothing affirmative to justify others in assuming that
he has consented to a further holding out.60
This does not mean that a case may not involve questions relating
to both section 35 and section 16. For example, even though the
requisite notice has been given to relieve the defendant from liability
under section 35, if he should, at some later date, hold himself out
as a partner, or consent to being so represented by others, he would,
59. E.g., Raywinkle v. Southern Coal Co., 117 Ark. 283, 174 S.W. 524 (1915)
(statute adopted subsequent to holding); Morris v. Brown, 115 Conn. 389, 162 Ad. 1
(1932) (same); Martinez v. Jacobson & Sons, Inc., 174 A.2d 735 (D.C. App. 1961);
Swigert v. Aspden, 52 Minn. 565, 54 N.W. 738 (1893) (statute adopted subsequent
to holding); Thompson v. Harmon, 207 S.W. 909 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919) (same);
see First Int'l Bank v. Brown, 130 Minn. 210, 153 N.W. 522 (1915). The same result
has been reached in England under section 36 of the Partnership Act of 1890, 53 & 54
Vict., c. 39. Tower Cabinet Co. v. Ingram, [1949] 2 K.B. 397.
60. See discussion in text following note 5 supra. In some situations it may seem
incongruous to draw a distinction between prior and subsequent creditors. Thus, suppose
that, there having been no notice by publication, a prior creditor, having no knowledge
of the dissolution, tells the plaintiff, a subsequent creditor who had never heard of
the partnership, that the defendant is still a partner. If the plaintiff should advance
credit in reliance upon this assumed state of affairs, presumably his only ground of
recovery would be under section 16 of the act, since he had not "known of the partner-
ship prior to dissolution" and hence could not recover under section 35. Arguably the
defendant, by failing to give the requisite notice by publication, has "consented" to his
being held out by others (i.e., the prior creditor) as a partner and hence should be
liable by estoppel. However, no cases appear to have taken the position that mere
failure to publish notice amounts to "consent" for the purpose of section 16 and, in
fact, the implication from related holdings may be otherwise. See note 59 supra.
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of course, be liable under section 16 in the same manner as if he had
never in fact been a partner.6' Similarly, liability may co-exist under
both sections of the statute where there has been a holding out and,
in addition, no notice of retirement has been given.62 Finally, where
there has been no holding out subsequent to retirement, and hence
no liability under section 16, it goes without saying that liability under
section 35 may be absent as well, as where the requisite notice has
been given, or where the defendant has been a so-called "dormant"
partner.
63
With regard to the question of "dormancy" section 35(2) of the
act provides that a partner's liability shall be satisfied out of partner-
ship assets alone where, prior to dissolution of the partnership, he has
been "unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract
is made; and... [so] far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs
that the business reputation of the partnership could not be said to
have been in any degree due to his connection with it."M This
language was due largely to a critique of the original version of the
act by Professor Crane where he pointed out that, as drafted, the act
might impose liability upon a dormant partner, a result which was
not only inconsistent with case law,65 but also unjust, since the reason
for imposing liability, namely reliance by the third party, is not present
where the defendant is dormant.6 This criticism was subsequently
acknowledged as well taken, and section 35 was redrafted to clarify
it and bring it more in accord with existing law.67
Section 35 (2) in effect relieves a dormant partner of the require-
ment of giving either actual or constructive notice. The concept of
dormancy is fairly well articulated: Not only must the defendant be
61. UNwonv PnTmwnasmP ACT § 35 (4). See LNDLE, PARTNasmp 291 (11th ed.
1950) (citing authorities).
62. E.g., Fisher v. Colorado Cent. Power Co., 94 Colo. 218, 29 P.2d 641 (1934).
63. E.g., Warner v. Modano, 340 Mass. 439, 164 N.E.2d 904 (1960).
64. See discussion in text prior to note 44 supra.
65. E.g., Hornaday v. Cowgill, 54 Ind. App. 631, 101 N.E. 1030 (1913).
66. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 HaRv. L. REv. 762, 783-84
(1915). Unfortunately, Professor Crane characterized section 35 liability as being based
on estoppel. "The reason for such a rule," he observed, "is that the third person should
be allowed to assume that the partner's connection with the firm and liability for its
obligations continues unless he has some notice to the contrary. It is an estoppel. If
the third person has never been informed of the partner's connection with the firm, no
credit is extended in reliance upon his supposed liability, and the reason for holding
him liable on a contract to which he is not a party disappears." Id. at 783. (Emphasis
added.) It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that such an analysis is
possible only if the term "estoppel" is used in a nontechnical sense, although admittedly,
the fundamental considerations of justice involved are analogous.
67. See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29
HAnv. L. REv. 291, 311-12 (1916). Dean Lewis was one of the principal draftsmen
of the act, although the task had originally been assigned to Dean James Barr Ames
of Harvard, who managed to complete a preliminary version of the statute prior to his
death on January 8, 1910.
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"unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract is made"
but he must fulfill roughly analogous requirements as regards the
partnership's business reputation generally, or how the enterprise ap-
pears to the public as a whole. Thus, if the plaintiff knew the de-
fendant to have been a partner and relied upon his having continued
to be such, it is irrelevant that the partner's association with the firm
was such as to have had no effect upon its business reputation because
of his having been otherwise unknown and inactive.0 The important
thing is what the plaintiff knew and relied upon, although the de-
fendant must show that he was similarly unknown to others as well.
Assuming that this comparatively rigid test is met, however, the de-
fendant is relieved of liability to prior dealers as well as to those who
may have dealt with the firm for the first time on a credit basis subse-
quent to its dissolution.
From what has already been said, it appears that a retired partner
may be held liable for obligations subsequently incurred even if he is
unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract is made,
where he is known to the public as a partner in such a way that the
business reputation of the firm is affected by his connection with it.
Thus suppose that the plaintiff knows of the partnership prior to its
dissolution by X's retirement and yet does not know X to be connected
with the firm. Suppose, in addition, that it is generally assumed by the
public that X is still a partner because he has never given the requisite
actual or constructive notice under section 35. In such a situation,
the two-fold test of "dormancy" under section 35(2) has not been met
("dormancy" both to the public and to the particular person with
whom the contract is made). If the plaintiff knew of the partnership
prior to its dissolution and no constructive notice was given, he may
recover despite his total ignorance of X and his apparent connection
with the partnership. The result is the same as with regard to prior
dealers,69 and different from the situation where liability is founded
upon estoppel under section 16, where the plaintiff must be aware of
the defendant's being held out as a partner, although it may not be
necessary that he go further and show reliance upon the defendants
financial standing.70 Thus liability of a retired partner under section
35, although it has a superficial resemblance to liability based on es-
toppel, especially when the exception regarding "dormant" partners is
considered, is not in fact estoppel. Indeed it may be analogous to
responsibility of an undisclosed principal for the acts of his agent,
where liability may exist in complete ignorance of the principal's
68. See Milmo Nat'l Bank v. Carter, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 151, 20 S.W. 836 (1892)
(non-statutory holding).
69. See text discussion prior to note 48 supra and cases cited therein.
70. See text discussion following notes 16 & 26 supra.
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identity. Yet, since the retired partner is not in fact a principal, except
under the conditions of section 35 or section 16, his liability is not as




Since it should be evident from the above discussion that liability
under section 35 is not based on estoppel, and hence extends beyond
liability under section 16, it remains to be demonstrated that, despite
its title, "Partner by Estoppel," section 16 itself provides for a form
of liability more akin to that of apparent authority than to estoppel.
The classic controversy, which may be more semantic than real,72
as to whether apparent authority is based on estoppel or something
else may still be unresolved. Yet, after endorsement for a number of
years by the American Law Institute of the view that apparent
authority and estoppel are not equivalents, 3 it may have become
apparent that the trend of the law is in this direction. This is so
particularly in view of other types of liability which are obviously not
based on estoppel, such as liability of an undisclosed principal and
the so-called "power" of an agent to bind his principal.74 If this view
is correct, the principal's liability is based not upon estoppel to deny
agency or authority, but on fundamental assumptions of the "objec-
tive" theory of contract law, that a person should be bound by his
-words and behavior rather than by his secret and unnanifested intent.
Thus where a principal indicates, either by words or conduct, his
willingness to be bound by the acts of an agent, he is bound just as
if he had dealt with the third party directly.7 5 The result is a contract
and the principal is not only bound but may have corresponding
rights thereunder, rights which are not dependent upon ratification.76
71. E.g., the now familiar principle of liability under the rule of Watteau v. Fenwick,
[1892] 1 Q.B. 346. See RESTATmmNT (SECoND), AGENCY § 195 (1957).
72. See, e.g., the battle between Cook and Ewart: Cook, Agency by Estoppel, 5
,CoLum. L. REv. 36 (1905); Ewart, Agency by Estoppel, 5 COLuM. L. REv. 354
(1905); Cook, Agency by Estoppel: A Reply, 6 CoLtrm. L. REv. 34 (1906).
73. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 8 (1957). The position of the Institute may
hlave been due largely to Professor Seavey's pioneering efforts in this area. See, e.g.,
Seavey, Agency Pouwers, 1 OKrA. L. REv. 3 (1948); Seavey, The Rationale of Agency,
.9 YALE L.J. 859 (1920). Seavey's position is similar to that of Cook, supra note 72,
.and both are opposed to Ewart's analysis, which may have been more appropriate to the
,older cases than it is to more modem materials.
74. See Seavey, supra note 73.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 8, comment d (1957).
76. Ibid. See particularly illustrations 8 and 9. Compare this form of liability with
ithat based on ratification, where the third party may withdraw from the contract up
-until the time of affirmance by the principal. RESTATEmENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 88
(1957). The English view which denies the third party such a right of withdrawal,
supposedly justified by a literal interpretation of the "relation-back" aspect of ratifica-
tion, is more akin to liability created by apparent authority, except for the crucial
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Although the point may be somewhat academic, except in cases where
the third party has attempted to withdraw from the contract before
the principal ratifies or otherwise seeks enforcement of his rights, it
is nonetheless worth making if only to establish the true character of
liability based on apparent authority or "power" of an agent to bind."
Against this background it is instructive to look at section 16(2) of
the Uniform Partnership Act, which provides:
When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an existing
partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is an agent
of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them to the same
extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in fact, with
respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where all the members
of the existing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act
or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of
the person acting and the persons consenting to the representation.
Does the above resemble more liability based on estoppel or does
it partake of at least some of the characteristics of apparent authority?
To be sure, reliance upon the representation is required, but this is
true with apparent authority as well as with estoppel. More im-
portant is the fact that those who consent to the representation are
bound and, where all the members of the partnership consent to the
representation, a partnership act or obligation results in precisely the
same manner as an obligation arising from the authorized act of one
who is a partner in fact. This implies, not that the partner or the
partnership is estopped, but that it is bound, and correspondingly, that
the third party is bound. In other words, there is not so much estoppel
here as there is an existing contract, created under conditions analo-
gous to those required in the traditional estoppel situation. Hence,
where the members of the partnership consent to the representation,
the partner "by estopper' assumes the same status as a partner in fact
with regard to third parties, binding the partnership as fully as any
partner under section 9 of the act.78 Although it is still possible to
distinction that, if there is apparent authority, the principal is of course bound from
the beginning. See Bolton Partners v. Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 295 (1889). An excellent
recent discussion of the Bolton case appears in Powsi_, AcENcY 141-47 (2d ed. 1961).
77. See the Reporter's Notes to REsTATEmN (SECOND), AGENCY § 8 (app. 1957).
78. UNwoRm PARTNEnsmp ACT § 9, imposing liability with regard to acts "for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership .... " Merely
because a partner is liable as such to third parties does not of course mean that he
is a partner. The converse in fact is generally true, and partners by estoppel are not
partners inter se. See section 7 of the act and 1 RowrLFE, PArTNsup § 7.1 (2d ed.
1960). Thus, for example, merely because a person may be liable as if he were a
partner, and makes others liable if they consent to his being represented as such, he
does not have rights as a partner, e.g., for an accounting from his colleagues. On the
other hand, it does not follow that the partnership may acquire no rights against third
parties based on the combined effect of section 16(2) and section 9.
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refer to the other members of the partnership as being "estopped," it
is significant that section 16 states that not only a partnership obliga-
tion has resulted but also a partnership "act." Thus it seems appropri-
ate that the usual consequences of a partnership act would follow,
namely the creation of contractual relationships with third parties,
instead of an anomalous one-sided liability by estoppel. This is per-
haps as it should be. If the members of the firm are to be held to
liability incurred by the partner "by estoppel" they should be entitled
to any benefits which may accrue from his activities ostensibly on
behalf of the firm. Although, as in the case of unauthorized acts of
an agent, it is frequently possible to reach the same result by way of
ratification, the difference in theory may be more than merely
academic in cases where the third party has attempted to withdraw
before ratification has taken place.79 If the members of the partner-
ship are bound ab initio, then why should the third party have such
a right of withdrawal, giving him an option to disaffirm which he
never expected or bargained for? Hence the ratification doctrine may
be inappropriate in this area and section 16 cases should be governed
more by the policies and approaches used with regard to apparent
authority and "power" to bind, than by the somewhat antique concept
of "estoppel."
It is without doubt ironic that a discussion of "partnership by
estoppel" should conclude with a suggestion that liability under both
sections 16 and 35 should be based not on estoppel but on some other
doctrine. It is, in addition, unlikely that courts will discontinue the
use of the well-worn phrase "estoppel." On the other hand, it is
becoming rapidly apparent that, like some other pieces of furniture
in our legal household, "estoppel" is inadequate and inappropriate in
dealing with modern problems. Perhaps it should be consigned to the
attic along with grandmother's antimacassar, and first year law stu-
dents be cautioned against use of this tongue-twister with the preten-
tious sound and doubtful meaning. Obscuring more issues than it
resolves, it may add little and confuse greatly.
79. See notes 76 & 77 supra.

